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Constitutional law can be conceived as a complex of ordinary
understandings - widely held assumptions, straightforwardly framed (if
not always consistent). But constitutional law might also be thought of
as an intensive resource, a body of materials available for close argu-
ments, complex formulations, ongoing criticism: recurring contests and
reformulations. Constitutional law may take either demotic or esoteric
forms. In some instances ordinarily understood constitutional law and
intensively explored constitutional law diverge. The Schiavo contro-
versy, I think, supplies one example. Around the time Congress acted to
grant federal courts jurisdiction over the matter, critics claimed that this
legislation obviously flouted basic constitutional norms. After federal
judges seemingly refused to exercise this new authority, other critics
contended that the judges not only acted impertinently, but also ignored
the well-established constitutional division of responsibilities. In this
Article - which will likely strike its readers as intensive and esoteric - I
claim that Congress acted constitutionally and that the federal judges
rightly put to use the protective jurisdiction that Congress had granted
them. It turned out, though, that the constitutional problem that
appeared to justify congressional intervention had already been
addressed - in a surprisingly bold way - by Florida state court judges
interpreting state law.
We do not live in a constitutional law equivalent of the best of all
possible worlds. The arguments that I sketch here should not be attrib-
uted to Congressman Tom DeLay (if he was indeed the moving force in
Congress) or any of the other participants in the Schiavo legislative clan-
gor. Almost certainly, there was no congressional-judicial consensus in
fact. This Article is an entirely academic exercise. Its value may lie in
the independent worth (if any) of its assembled formulations of U.S. and
Florida constitutional law. The discussion of Fourteenth Amendment
"equal protection of the laws" is perhaps especially provocative.
I. THE RETROACTIVITY PROBLEM
It is not at all surprising that the hurried congressional enactment
granting federal district court jurisdiction to hear arguments raised by
Terri Schiavo's parents appeared to be constitutionally dubious. The
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
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legislation addressed only a single case seemingly finally adjudicated in
state courts.' Thomas Cooley summarized what was already conven-
tional wisdom in 1868:
[L]egislative action cannot be made ... to reverse decisions which
the courts, in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made;
for this would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would
be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the
legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which the parties
might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the courts.'
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations discussed attempts of state legisla-
tors to revise the decisions of state courts.3 In Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm,4 Justice Scalia echoed Judge Cooley in holding that Congress vio-
lated basic separation of powers principles by attempting to revive cases
that federal courts had previously dismissed pursuant to the then-appli-
cable statutes of limitation. "The prohibition is violated when an indi-
vidual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very best of
reasons, such as the legislature's genuine conviction . . . that the judg-
ment was wrong . . . ."I Why should the same conclusion not follow if
Congress acted to reopen state court determinations via new federal
court proceedings? 6 Judge Birch, writing in one of the federal proceed-
ings undertaken pursuant to the Schiavo jurisdictional enactment, argued
as much: "Manifestly, because the Act applies only to this case it lacks
1. See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
§ 1, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
2. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 94 (Lawbook Exchange
1999) (1868). On Cooley and constitutional law as common understanding, see PAUL
CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION 9-10, 33, 35, 56-57
(1999).
3. See also Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004) ("[I]t is without question an
invasion of the authority of the judicial branch for the Legislature to pass a law that allows the
executive branch to interfere with the final judicial determination in a case.").
4. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
5. Id. at 228 (emphasis omitted).
6. In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), Justice Ginsburg wrote for a majority of the Supreme Court,
upholding the EPA's power under the Clean Air Act to issue stop orders (with respect to a
particular question arising under the Act) directed at ongoing state administrative hearings that the
EPA concluded were proceeding in error. Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by three other
Justices, arguing that the majority's analysis extended to cases involving state judicial proceedings
as well as agency action.
Under the majority's holding, decisions by state courts would be subject to being
overturned, not just by any agency, but by an agency established by a different
sovereign. We should be reluctant to interpret a congressional statute to deny to
States the judicial independence guaranteed by their own constitutions. . . . For
States to have a role .... their own governing processes must be respected.
Id. at 512-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the generality and prospectivity of legislation that comports with the
basic tenets of the separation of powers."7
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, show that retroactive leg-
islation reopening particular cases is not always unconstitutional. In
Miller v. French,8 for example, the Court held that a statutory automatic
stay was constitutional notwithstanding its effect on a previously issued
judicial injunction. "Prospective relief under a continuing, executory
decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying
law."9 Writing subsequently, Tenth Circuit Judge McConnell explained
decisions like Miller especially clearly:
Within the scope of its enumerated powers, Congress has authority to
enact laws to govern matters of public right, . . . and authority to
change those laws. Even when the Judiciary has issued a legal judg-
ment enforcing a congressional act - for example, by a writ of
injunction - it is no violation of the judicial power for Congress to
change the terms of the underlying substantive law. The purpose of
an injunction is to define and enforce legal obligations, not to freeze
them into place. Thus, when Congress changes the laws, it is those
amended laws - not the terms of past injunctions - that must be given
prospective legal effect.'°
The judicial order at issue in the Schiavo controversy was a version
of an injunction. As a matter of Florida law, in cases turning on the
wishes of comatose individuals, "courts are always open to adjudicate
legitimate questions pertaining to the written or oral instructions."" But
Congress expressly declared that it was not changing applicable substan-
tive law.12 Plaut should control and not Miller, right? United States v.
'Klein13 is often thought to hold that Congress cannot "direct[ ] decisions
in pending cases without amending any law."' 4 Klein is controversial,
however. 5 Klein involved a federal judicial action and not a state court
7. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J.,
concurring).
8. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
9. Id. at 344.
10. Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2004).
11. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
12. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 5,
119 Stat. 15 (2005) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive rights not
otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the several States.").
13. 80 U.S. 128 (1872).
14. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
15. See, e.g., id. ("we need not consider whether this reading of Klein is correct"); RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 339 (5th ed. 2003) (Klein "raises more questions than it
answers"). For close contrasting discussions of Klein in the Schiavo context, see Evan Caminker,
Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529 (2005), and Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears
Its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553, 570-81 (2005).
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proceeding (like the Schiavo case). Should this matter?' 6
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AFTER CRUZAN
These questions point to a question even more basic: which provi-
sion of the U.S. Constitution authorized Congress to enact the Schiavo
jurisdictional grant? The list of possible grounds for exercise of federal
judicial power set up in Article III, Section 2, supplies Congress with a
menu. 7 Granting Article III courts the ability to adjudicate entirely
state law controversies is an available option given, for example, diver-
sity of state citizenship as between parties - a circumstance not present
in the Schiavo case. The Schiavo grant, it appears, fits constitutionally
only if it falls within the compass of Article III, Section 2's federal ques-
tion jurisdiction - "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under Their Authority." Congress is not, of course, free
to define whatever it wants to be a federal question. The constitutional
key, Justice Frankfurter observed in Lincoln Mills, is "the presence of
some substantial federal interest, one of greater weight and dignity than
questionable doubt concerning the effectiveness of state procedure."' 8
The Schiavo statute needs, therefore, some evident constitutional footing
(absent, of course, a pertinent statutory right of action). 9
How could any constitutional provision other than Article III, Sec-
tion 2, be relevant if Congress did not change underlying substantive law
in the Schiavo case? This question suggests another: why didn't Con-
gress affirmatively legislate - in some obviously substantive way - pur-
suant to the grant of power set out in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?2 ° The Schiavo controversy, after all, plainly put in con-
flict conceptions of life and liberty and, thus, the meaning - within the
context of the decision whether to withdraw life support - of due pro-
cess of law. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much years earlier in
16. Federalism principles, it might be thought, are the equivalent of Article III in this context.
"[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
162 (1992).
17. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. m, § 1.
18. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 483-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Concerning the long lasting, if fitful debate regarding "protective jurisdiction," the
foil for Justice Frankfurter's formula, see FALLON, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 847-55.
19. Article I1, Section 2, cannot itself count as the basis of a constitutional claim (that would
be too circular). See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 157, 190 n.42 (1953).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
[Vol. 61:763
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.2' But the Court,
we all know, has frequently viewed congressional assertions of Section
5 authority with considerable skepticism. Especially since City of
Boerne v. Flores,2 2 Justices writing majority opinions (even if only bare
majority opinions) have repeatedly declared that congressional asser-
tions of violations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment - the due
process and equal protection requirements, for example - have to be
manifestly grounded in a legislative record demonstrating sufficiently
widespread, sufficiently obvious transgressions.23 Because of the brief
period before which congressional action would become too late in the
Schiavo matter, the time needed for proper record building may have
precluded development of a substantive formula to be put to use by fed-
eral courts assessing the Florida law for Section 5 purposes. We also all
know, however, that the Supreme Court is less demanding if legislation
pretty much tracks the Court's own understandings of Fourteenth
Amendment priorities.24 Why was it not possible, if the Cruzan deci-
sion was an available template, to frame a workable congruent formula
for federal review in the Schiavo case?
25
Cruzan upheld a Missouri requirement that, before a court could
approve withdrawal of life support from an unconscious individual,
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the individual, if con-
scious, would indeed choose to refuse life support in the circumstances
at hand. On the record as it then stood, Missouri courts ruled that evi-
dence of Nancy Cruzan's wishes (as expressed before her automobile
accident) did not meet the standard. 26 Chief Justice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion concluded that the clear and convincing evidence require-
ment did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.27
The individual's potentially conflicting constitutional interests in life
21. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-81 (1990).
22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (reviewing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
23. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
25. For arguments that the Cruzan and Schiavo cases are indistinguishable, see Edward J.
Larson, From Cruzan to Schiavo: Similar Bedfellows in Fact and at Law, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
405 (2005).
26. Further development of the record later led Missouri courts to the opposite conclusion.
See id. at 408.
27. Discussing congressional power in the Schiavo case, Michael Paulsen eloquently outlines
a procedural due process right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard - a fight that he suggests
Cruzan did not address because of the focus there on substantive due process. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Killing Terry Schiavo, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 585, 588-90 (2005); see id. at 586-87. It is
not clear, we may think, that the "what process is due" inquiry is anything other than one version
of substantive due process analysis. Professor Paulsen does not, in any case, attempt to fit his
narrow reading of Cruzan within the parameters of the Supreme Court's Section 5 decisions.
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and liberty justified the state's decision to proceed carefully - if the
individuals interest in choosing for herself was therefore burdened, it
was done in the service of protecting her interest in life (an interest that
the state itself could properly take seriously). 8
Cruzan was not a case in which family members disagreed about a
comatose individual's wishes. But several of the Justices who wrote
opinions plainly anticipated the prospect of family conflict. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist emphasized that the choice was the individual's and not
one belonging to her or his family members, noting the possible con-
flicts of interest family members might confront.2 9 The need to be sure
that the choice was really the individual's rather than the family's con-
tributed to justifying Missouri's use of the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard.30 Justice Brennan, dissenting, treated conflicts of
interest as an only occasional problem, readily solved through the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.3' Brennan stressed the importance
of a trial judge hearing testimony from a wide range of family and
friends about what they knew of an unconscious individual's beliefs,
however informally those beliefs might have been expressed. An
encompassing inquiry of this sort would be the surest means of develop-
ing a sufficient sense of the individual's preferences (this inquiry, he
thought, rendered a heightened standard of proof unnecessary and thus
arbitrary).32 Justice Stevens, also dissenting, argued that even if efforts
to determine what an unconscious individual's "choice" would have
been prove to be pointless,33 it would nonetheless be possible to assess
"[t]he best interests of the individual."34 Careful judicial inquiry should
be adequate to the task. "It may be that the best we can do is to ensure
that these choices are made by those who will care enough about the
patient to investigate his or her interests with particularity and cau-
28. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-83 (1990).
29. Chief Justice Rehnquist posed this possibility:
Close family members may have a strong feeling - a feeling not at all ignoble or
unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either - that they do not wish to witness the
continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless, meaningless,
and even degrading. But there is no automatic assurance that the view of close
family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had
she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent.
Id. at 286.
30. See id. at 280-81.
31. Id. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 328 n.23.
32. "The testimony of close friends and family members... may often be the best evidence
available of what the patient's choice would be. It is they with whom the patient most likely will
have discussed such questions and they who know the patient best." Id. at 325.
33. See id. at 352 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 350, 352.
[Vol. 61:763
PANGLOSS
tion."35 Stevens, it appears, treated judges as ultimately responsible for
determining the "best interests" of the comatose individual - and as
entirely capable of taking on that task.
36
Florida like Missouri fixed the clear and convincing evidence test
as the standard pertinent for judging whether an individual now uncon-
scious would wish to refuse life support.37 The Schiavo controversy, it
seemed, concerned the state of the record; more precisely, whether Terri
Schiavo's parents had introduced evidence, or had been denied the
opportunity to introduce evidence - additional tests, biographical detail,
and the like - that had or would have sufficiently complicated the ques-
tion of what Terri Schiavo wanted. If the trial judge was understood as
artificially restricting the range of inquiry, the approach that Justice
Brennan outlined in his Cruzan dissent might be read as supporting the
arguments and criticisms of Terni Schiavo's parents. Brennan's dissent,
however, is plainly not - by itself - an authoritative indicator of well-
established constitutional law that Congress could straightforwardly
enforce via Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The Cruzan
majority opinion, moreover, did not declare the "clear and convincing
evidence" requirement to be constitutionally necessary; rather, Chief
Justice Rehnquist held only that this standard of proof was not unconsti-
tutional.39 Due process of law, as the Supreme Court understood it,
acknowledged the possibility that states might adopt other, differing rec-
onciliations of the conflicting individual interests in life and liberty.4 ° It
would be difficult for Congress, obviously, to purport to legislate in the
name of due process of law if it simply substituted one entirely constitu-
tional approach for another.
III. THE FLORIDA STRUCTURE
Back to basics: If the Schiavo legislation finds constitutional
authorization in the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be plausibly under-
standable as a congressional response to unconstitutional state action.
35. Id. at 354.
36. See id. at 353-55.
37. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990).
38. For a thoughtful, extended effort to work through one version of Justice Brennan's
assumptions - in this instance, giving priority to consultation and mediation in preference to
litigation, bringing to bear healthcare expertise, and (perhaps inevitably) abstracting somewhat
from the Sophoclean elements of the Schiavo case itself, see Mary Coombs, Schiavo: The Road
Not Taken, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (2007).
39. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280; see also Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289,
1294-95 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
40. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278, 284. A similar emphasis on the discretion states are
constitutionally afforded is evident in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997), for
example, which addressed the states' authority to legislate regarding life-ending procedures.
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"[A]ny legislation by [C]ongress... must necessarily be corrective in its
character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of ... prohib-
ited state laws or proceedings of state officers."'" The question of Terri
Schiavo's wishes or Michael Schiavo's conduct cannot be the first con-
cern. Florida law, it must seem, is the problem.
The 1990 Florida Supreme Court decision In re Guardianship of
Browning42 recognized the "right to choose or refuse medical treatment"
and associated this right with the principal proposition of article I, sec-
tion 23, of the Florida Constitution:4 3 "Every natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's
private life .. . ." Justice Barkett's majority opinion, however, was
also plainly an exercise in common-law manufacture, judicial legislation
working out implications of the constitutional starting point at consider-
able length.4" Browning acknowledged that in cases in which an indi-
vidual is not conscious, "a close family member or friend," or another
41. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883), quoted in United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 624 (2000).
42. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
43. Id. at 11; see id. at 10; see also In re Dubreuil. 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993)
("overarching" constitutional privacy right "overlaps with the right to freely exercise one's
religion to protect the right of a person to refuse a blood transfusion").
44. Art. I, § 23, FLA. CONST. The constitutional text adds "except as provided herein" and
concludes: 'This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public
records and meetings as provided by law." Id. Browning does not, however, treat the right to
choose that it recognizes as limited only by the terms of the article I, section 23, itself:
The state has a duty to assure that a person's wishes regarding medical treatment are
respected. That obligation serves to protect the rights of the individual from
intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling interest great enough to
override this constitutional right. The means to carry out any such compelling
interest must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard
the rights of the individual.
In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13-14. For extended discussion of possible
compelling interests not relevant in the Schiavo case, see In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 824-28,
and see also In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14, in which interests were treated as
not compelling.
45. A few years earlier, in a living will case, the Florida Supreme Court had proceeded
entirely in common-law terms. See John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1984). But other prior decisions invoked constitutional rights of privacy. See Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980), adopting Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984). The conjunction of constitutional interpretation and judicial rule-writing is notable -
although plainly not unprecedented - in federal constitutional law. See generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). Within Florida
constitutional law, however, the Florida Supreme Court's primary responsibility for judicial
procedure is well established. See, e.g., State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045, 1048-49 (Fla. 2005).
Judge-made common law is constitutionally protected, up to a point, as a second source of
substantive law, alongside statutes. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So.
2d 1067, 1076-77 (Fla. 2006); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., Inc., 753 So. 2d
55, 57-59 (Fla. 2000).
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surrogate designated by the individual, "may carry out the patients
instructions. '"46 The court announced a series of ground rules:
A surrogate must take great care in exercising the patient's right of
privacy, and must be able to support that decision with clear and con-
vincing evidence. Before exercising the incompetent's right to
forego treatment, the surrogate must satisfy the following conditions:
1. The surrogate must be satisfied that the patient executed any docu-
ment knowingly, willingly, and without undue influence, and that the
evidence of the patient's oral declarations is reliable;
2. The surrogate must be assured that the patient does not have a
reasonable probability of recovering competency so that the right
could be exercised directly by the patient; and
3. The surrogate must take care to assure that any limitations or con-
ditions expressed either orally or in the written declaration have been
carefully considered and satisfied.4 7
In many instances, Browning supposed, a patient's wishes would be
clear - and thus "the surrogate need not obtain prior judicial approval to
carry out those wishes."48 In the event of dispute, "courts are always
open."4 9 "[Jludicial intervention" should be "expedited," however, and
to this end, at the Florida Supreme Court's request, a specially designed
probate rule was written to structure such proceedings.5 0
The Florida Legislature has also acted.5 ' Section 765.401, Florida
Statutes, first adopted in 1992 and subsequently amended, restates the
Browning standard governing decisionmakers acting as surrogates for
incapacitated individuals:
[A] proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging proce-
dures must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the
46. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15 n.15.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, however, was not prepared to grant a surrogate the same
freedom from challenge that it sought to accord intermediaries responding to the wishes of
competent individuals acting for themselves. "When a health care provider, acting in good faith,
follows the wishes of a competent and informed patient to refuse medical treatment, the health
care provider is acting appropriately and cannot be subjected to civil or criminal liability." In re
Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 823-24 (emphasis supplied).
49. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
50. Id. (emphasis in original); see FLA. PROB. R. 5.900.
51. See § 765.101 et seq., FLA. STAT. (2006). The elaborate statutory scheme,
notwithstanding its breadth and detail, does not claim to be legally definitive:
The provisions of this chapter are cumulative to the existing law regarding an
individual's right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment and do not
impair any existing rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, a patient,
including a minor, competent or incompetent person, or a patient's family may have
under the common law, Federal Constitution, State Constitution, or statutes of this
state.
§ 765.106; see Alice Reiter Feld, Life Prolonging Procedures and Related Issues, in FLORIDA
GUARDIANSHIP PRAcTncE 3-10 to -I1 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing safe harbor effects).
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decision would have been one the patient would have chosen had the
patient been competent or, if there is no indication of what the patient
would have chosen, that the decision is in the patient's best interest.
52
In addition, the legislature fixed priority rules identifying surrogates in
cases in which unconscious individuals had made no prior designation.
The first choice was "[t]he judicially appointed guardian of the patient
... if such guardian has been previously appointed. '53 The list thereaf-
ter added the patient's spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, an "adult
relative . . . who has exhibited special care and concern," concluding
with "[a] close friend."54 Statutory acknowledgement of - indeed, def-
erence to - "judicially appointed guardian[s]" locates section 765 within
a particular legal milieu, suggesting a variation on, or coexistence with,
the larger office of guardianship, a statutory grant of agency elaborately
defined and regulated in chapter 744, Florida Statutes. Chapter 744
declares that individuals who possess requisite qualifications, who show
that other individuals are incapacitated in pertinent respects, and who
present adequate plans - initially and annually thereafter - may acquire
broad authority via judicial order to act on behalf of identified incapaci-
tated individuals, including power "[t]o consent to medical and mental
health treatment. 56
Chapters 765 and 744 overlap conceptually - albeit not entirely.
Chapter 744 guardians are, by and large, legislatively depicted as exer-
cising discretion and as ordinarily acting independently of immediate
judicial oversight in the course of addressing issues that an incapacitated
individual would have resolved if capable. In the moment, at least, 744
guardians are relatively autonomous, even if subject before or after the
fact to plan-making obligations, to accounting requirements, and to adju-
dicative inquiries in cases of third-party objections.5 1 Chapter 765 simi-
larly characterizes proxies - judicially appointed guardians and other
individuals included in the statutory list - as empowered to make
"health care decisions ... for the patient.- 5 8 But proxy discretion is now
52. § 765.401, FLA. STAT. (2006). The "patient's best interest" alternative included at the
provision's end was added in 2001, after the onset of the Schiavo controversy; it was not invoked
in the Schiavo case itself. See § 765.401(3); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 819
n.3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
53. § 765.401(l)(a).
54. § 765.401(l)(b)-(g).
55. See generally Nicola Jaye Boone, Establishing the Guardianship, in FLORIDA
GUARDIANSHIP PRACTICE, supra note 51, at 12-1 to -27; Robert P. Scheb, Guardian of the Person:
Duties, Responsibilities, and Liabilities, in FLORIDA GUARDIANSHIP PRACTICE, supra note 51, at
14-1 to -18 (4th ed. 2002).
56. § 744.3215(3)(f), FLA. STAT. (2006).





considerably more statutorily structured. Proxies are obligated to
"[c]onsult expeditiously with appropriate health care providers" in giv-
ing consent and to obtain "access to the appropriate medical records. '5
9
Especially pointedly:
In determining whether the patient has a terminal condition, has an
end-stage condition, or is in a persistent vegetative state or may
recover capacity, . . . the patient's attending or treating physician and
at least one other consulting physician must separately examine the
patient. The findings of each such examination must be documented
in the patient's medical record and signed by each examining physi-
cian before life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or
withdrawn.6"
It is against this closely structured backdrop that a chapter 765 proxy
proceeds for purposes of deciding whether "to withhold or withdraw
life-prolonging procedures" is "supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the decision would have been one the patient would have
chosen had the patient been competent. 6 t
Chapter 765, it would seem, provides points of departure sufficient
to enable close judicial scrutiny of decisions by guardians or other prox-
ies. Moreover, Florida Probate Rule 5.900 facilitates inquiry, defining a
"proceeding for expedited judicial intervention concerning medical
treatment procedures" that might "be brought by any interested adult
person," resulting in a preliminary hearing within seventy-two hours.62
At this hearing a court may either "rule on the relief requested immedi-
ately" or "[i]n its discretion ... conduct an evidentiary hearing not later
than 4 days after the preliminary hearing and rule on the relief requested
immediately. '63 Neither rule 5.900 nor chapter 765 defines a standard
of review for judges to use in assessing a proxy's resolution of pertinent
questions of fact. In the chapter 744 guardian setting, with respect to
questions of incompetency judicially declared to require clear and con-
vincing evidence, 4 appellate review of trial court findings turns on
59. § 765.205(b), (d), FLA. STAT. (2005); see § 765.401(3).
60. § 765.306, FLA. STAT. (2006). The requirements that the individual a guardian represents
have a terminal, end-state, or vegetative state condition - procedurally addressed by § 765.306 -
are fixed in § 765.305(2)(b) with respect to patient-designated surrogates' decisionmaking.
§ 765.401(3) incorporates § 765.305 and thus implicitly incorporates § 765.306 as well.
61. § 765.401(3).
62. FLA. PROB. R. 5.900(a), (d).
63. FLA. PROB. R. 5.900(d)(2).
64. See In re Bryan, 550 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1989) ("It is clear the statute provides no
guidance regarding the proper standard for adjudication of incompetency under section 744.331.
It is equally clear, as both parties recognize, that no case in Florida effectively settles the point.
The district court cited one case, from Ohio, which held that clear and convincing evidence was
the proper standard of proof in competency proceedings .... We find this reasoning compelling
and adopt with approval the above-cited language.").
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whether "competent substantial evidence" supports a trial court's con-
clusion that proof of incompetency was clear and convincing.65 In pari
materia: chapter 765 translation would not be difficult - easily under-
stood as part and parcel of the statutory scheme itself. The section
765.401 proxy - a guardian or other listed individual - proceeds very
much after the fashion of a judge ruling on the question of competency.
The proxy is the primary fact finder.
The statutory gap: In at least some cases the substantial evidence
test could effectively allow the proxy considerable discretion. It would
be "the purview" of the proxy "to determine the credibility and weight
of the evidence."' 66 A judicial inquiry invoked via rule 5.900 could not
"reweigh the testimony and evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact."'67 Chapter 765 in fact works to protect the discretion
of guardians or other proxies precisely through the limits it sets. Section
765.306, on this reading, functions as an important safe harbor. If two
physicians document and confirm a conclusion that an individual lives
in a persistent vegetative state, substantial evidence review should pose
no threat to a proxy who proceeds accordingly. The question of the
incapacitated individual's wishes per se remains open, of course, if now
likely dramatically shaded by the diagnosis. But disagreements about
how to resolve conflicts in testimony or how to weigh the implications
of testimony about the substance or seriousness of the individual's views
do not fall within the scope of the substantial evidence assessment. This
statutory bias might be reinforced in cases in which incapacitated indi-
viduals received extensive medical care with the consent of a chapter
744 guardian in advance of the judgment - by the 744 guardian who has
now become the 765 guardian - that life support should be withdrawn.
The attending or treating physician - whose report is obligatory for pur-
poses of section 765.306 - will likely have communicated with the
guardian repeatedly concerning the course of treatment, will not likely
have doubted the correctness of the choices made concerning the course
followed, and may often ratify, if not initially suggest (more or less
explicitly), the conclusion reached by the guardian that nothing more
65. Manassa v. Manassa, 738 So. 2d 997, 997-98 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
66. Id. at 997.
67. Id. at 997-98; see In re Bryan, 550 So. 2d at 448-49 (Grimes, J., dissenting) (the record
revealed substantial evidence supporting findings of both competency and incompetency).
Subsequent additional appellate supervision would likely work to mark judicial limits, perhaps
more often than it would reconsider proxy discretion. Cf. Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint
Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 198-99 (Fla. 2003); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761
So. 2d 1089, 1192-94 (Fla. 2000) (limiting district court of appeal review of circuit court certiorari




can or should be done. The decisionmaking process would thus reflect
an unsurprising, potentially biasing path dependency.
IV. "THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS"
Is there Fourteenth Amendment trouble in any of this? There
would need to be, of course, if Florida law were to suggest reason for
congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Schiavo
case.
The preceding discussion suggests the following:
First, the Florida legislative scheme sometimes affords substantial
discretion to proxies representing unconscious individuals in connection
with decisions whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment. In part,
this discretion is a side effect of deploying the substantial evidence stan-
dard to regulate judicial review. To be sure, use of this standard is not
explicitly dictated by statute. Given the overall organization of the leg-
islative regime, however, Florida judge-made administrative law clearly
points to substantial evidence as the pertinent benchmark structuring
adjudicative oversight of a proxy's determination that clear and convinc-
ing evidence establishes a represented individual's wishes. Sufficient
substantive evidence may, in some circumstances, be marshaled on
behalf of apparently clear and convincing preferences for both life and
death given the tunnel vision the standard imposes upon reviewing
judges. The proxy's opportunity for choice - we can see - thus
emerges. Exercises of discretion may well ramify especially elaborately
in cases like Schiavo in which the guardian who concludes that the rep-
resented individual would want termination was also the guardian who,
again in the exercise of discretion, previously consented to preceding
treatment efforts.68
Second, discretion, to the extent that it is therefore present,
introduces an irresolvable uncertainty or "wobble." In some circum-
stances at least, it will be impossible (within the terms of the statutory
setup) to declare unequivocally after the fact that termination or mainte-
nance of life support was not to some important degree a product of the
choices or views of the representative rather than the represented indi-
vidual.69 Obviously no legal apparatus eliminates all play in its joints.
The proxy's opportunity to exercise discretion, however, is not simply
68. See In re Guardianship of Theresa Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD, 1996 WL 33496839 (Fla.
Pinellas County Ct. June 18, 1996).
69. Dramatically underscoring the significance of the statutory grant of discretion, Lois
Shepherd provocatively explores how matters might have worked out if Bob and Mary Schindler
- Terri Schiavo's parents - had been named proxies. See Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo:
Unsettling the Settled, 37 LOYOLA UNIV. CHI. L.J. 297, 313-16 (2006).
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an accident of particular circumstances. It is also a straightforward
corollary or concomitant of the conjoined elements of the scheme, easily
read off the face of the legislative arrangement. In Browning, however,
the Florida Supreme Court started from the premise that - as a matter of
Florida constitutional law - the choice to end or continue life support
was precisely the individual's. The applicable Florida constitutional text
- article I, section 23 - declares "the right to be let alone and free from
government intrusion into the person's private life" to be not only an
individual right, but also an equal right: a right of "[e]very natural per-
son." Thus the statutory wobble, even if only occasionally manifest, is
troubling - especially anomalous not only in view of constitutional start-
ing points but also, it appears, the rooting of the anomalies in statutory
design itself.
This is, it may seem, a state law problem. There is no basis
presented warranting classification of the Schiavo statute as congres-
sional intervention enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes treated rooted variance, when it
coexists with a clear legal commitment to equal treatment, as inconsis-
tent with the state obligation to assure "the equal protection of the laws."
The Court's work reveals a few basic themes, cutting across a wide
range of cases, which define a second context - however much removed
from the immediate issues - within which the Schiavo legislation needs
to be set.7°
The point of departure is plainly far afield. In Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County Commission,7" Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, invalidated the "systematic"
70. The quick sketch that follows departs in some respects from formulas often - but not
always - put to use by courts and commentators. These departures, I think, make clearer
underlying affinities in cases that sometimes seem to be quite different from each other. I mean to
restate rather than revise - this is, of course, not always a significant difference - the overall
content of the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection work. The principal departures are these:
The so-called "suspect class" cases are described in terms that emphasize the similarities linking
decisions dealing with troubling socially widely used categories like race or gender and decisions
involving categories that are deemed to be problematic in important part because of the immediate
context of their use. The so-called "fundamental interest" cases are recast in terms that expand the
size of this set precisely by taking seriously the limits the Supreme Court fixed in 1973. The
"rational basis" test essentially disappears - it becomes simply the explanatory form for
describing cases in which, it turns out, there is no actual equal protection problem. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the overall effort is tied more closely than usual to the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the long history of some of its terms, and the Reconstruction crises its
drafters confronted. None of these attempts, of course, are fully worked out in the short space of
their presentation here. For present purposes, I mostly omit references to the huge body of
thoughtful commentary addressing equal protection topics.
71. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
[Vol. 61:763
PANGLOSS
policy72 of a West Virginia county tax assessor quantifying property's
worth on the basis of purchase price, a practice "that resulted in gross
disparities in the assessed value of generally comparable property"
73
given increases in market prices over time and transactional history. Not
all - only some - property was recently purchased and thus priced in
light of increased land values. The West Virginia Constitution, Rehn-
quist noted at the outset, "guarantees to its citizens that, with certain
exceptions, 'taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State,
and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value."' 74  As a result, West Virginia could not invoke the general
rule that "a State may divide different kinds of property into classes and
assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and
burdens are reasonable. ' 75 For example, it appeared, no "statute or prac-
tice ... authorizes individual counties of the State to fashion their own
substantive assessment policies."76 Rather, West Virginia's "Constitu-
tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners
shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its
estimated market value. 77
Allegheny Pittsburgh is not easy to defend, some readers argue.
"[I]t is ...hard[ ] to believe that the Court has established a general
principle that all systematic violations of state law by state officials can
be vindicated as a violation of the equal protection clause."78  In
Nordlinger v. Hahn,79 the Supreme Court subsequently upheld a Califor-
nia scheme originating in a state constitutional provision - California's
famous Proposition 13, which precisely authorized use of purchase
price, plainly contemplating the differences in tax assessments that in
fact resulted. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, however, did not
72. Id. at 345. Chief Justice Rehnquist explains at some length why the gross disparities in
assessed value were not simply artifacts of a policy of "seasonable attainment." See id. at 343-44.
73. Id. at 338.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 344.
76. Id. at 345.
77. Id.
78. William C. Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87, 104 (1990). John Ely disagreed
with Professor Cohen: "In theory, . . . there is no reason why certain possible justifying goals
should not be disabled from consideration on the ground that they violate state law." John Hart
Ely, Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. REV. 107, 108 (1990). Ely did not think
that the possibility that "all violations of state law ... are ... convertible into violations of the
Equal Protection Clause" mattered much "operationally" because "state courts remain the final
authorities on what is or is not a violation of state law" and "[w]here ... the fact of a federal
violation flows entirely from the fact that state law has been violated, . . . state law should be able
to set the remedy too." Id. at 109-10. The Supreme Court's error lay only in its failure to
appreciate this last proposition. Id. at 110-11.
79. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
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make much of the difference in state constitutional backdrops, even
though Allegheny Pittsburgh itself forecasted the distinction.8 ° Indeed,
Blackmun's discussion of Allegheny Pittsburgh itself is notable mostly
for its crabbed narrowness. 8 Justice Thomas, concurring, would have
rejected Allegheny Pittsburgh outright: "A violation of state law does
not by itself constitute a violation of the Federal Constitution."82 Chief
Justice Stone's formula propounded in Snowden v. Hughes,83 it appears,
remains canonical: "[S]tate action, even though illegal under state law,
can be no more and no less constitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than if it were sanctioned by the state ....
The hedges are obvious. Justice Thomas inserts the qualifier "by
itself';85 in passages in Snowden, Chief Justice Stone adds "without
more" and "for that reason alone" in asserting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment unimportance of "unlawful denial" under state law.8 6 The Equal
Protection Clause is not without its own preoccupations - for example,
reverberations of the constitutional language itself, the circumstances of
the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, and subsequent enforcement his-
tory. Analysis of variance - sensitivity to changes in the degree to
which announced legal commitments and official practice conform -
might matter because, in some circumstances, the Equal Protection
Clause (more precisely, its set of associated preoccupations) marks the
results of such analysis as constitutionally pertinent.
In Snowden, tellingly, Chief Justice Stone thought it important to
emphasize: "On the argument before us petitioner disclaimed any con-
tention that class or racial discrimination is involved."87 It is quite clear,
even if Supreme Court formulations differ in detail from case to case,
that criteria put to use by individuals acting under color of law raise
substantial equal protection concerns insofar as they evoke and thereby
reinforce antipathies threatening American political community. Stone
himself famously framed one version of this point. 88 State action
becomes constitutionally problematic insofar as it deepens risks of civil
war in all its variants, whether relatively general or quite specific to
particular circumstances - for example, Reconstruction racial terrorism
and its long-term metastatic byproducts, chronic misogyny and associ-
80. See Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 344 n.4.
81. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 & n.8 (1992).
82. Id. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
84. Id. at 11.
85. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 12.
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ated violent commitment to gender conventions, or any number of other
expressions of fear or loathing.
89
There is also a second central equal protection worry. Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in its first sentence, dictates definitions of
both federal and state citizenship, definitions insistently premised on the
principle of equal citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the States wherein they reside."90 The mandates
that Section 1 thereafter imposes upon the states - initially drafted as a
grant of congressional power "to make all laws necessary and proper to
secure all persons in every state . . . equal protection in their rights of
life, liberty, and property"'" - follow, as if matters of course, straightfor-
ward applications of the old and widely asserted formula, "the reciprocal
obligation of allegiance ... and protection."92 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposes the duty to protect, a forceful exercise entirely in train
with its specification of the individuals to whom the duty is owed and a
forceful exercise not simply as a matter of form, but rather precisely a
substantive undertaking given the circumstances prompting the Amend-
ment and the peculiar politics of its institution. Constitutional adher-
ence - whether individuals acting under color of state law indeed accept
their responsibility to "secure all persons" legal protections - is assumed
ex ante to be a matter in question, a form of fidelity that the Fourteenth
Amendment itself marks as doubtful.93
89. The point of departure, of course, is Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 560-61 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For extensions and elaborations, see, for
example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634-35 (1996), Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985), Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724-25 (1982), and Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), and see
also Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (2000), noting
that allegations of ill will undercut an assertion of rational basis.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis supplied).
91. BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1914).
92. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y. Gen. 382, 388 (1862); see also, e.g., Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep.
Ia, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B. 1608); THOMAS HOnBES, LEVIATHAN 560 (Barnes & Noble 2004)
(1651); LEGEs EDWARDI CONFESSORIS (1070), reprinted in BRUCE R. O'BREN, GOD'S PEACE AND
KING'S PEACE: THE LAWS OF EDWARD THE CONFESSOR 158-203 (1999); PROOEMIUM, THE LIBER
AUGUSTALIs 5 (James M. Powell, trans., Syracuse Univ. Press 1971) (1231).
93. This is not the proper occasion for full development of the propositions asserted above in
the text. Put too crudely, the key to appreciating the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment may well
be Section 3, initially excluding from federal or state office all Confederate participants who had
previously sworn state or federal oaths of office to support the U.S. Constitution. "After the civil
war practical policies required that the fundamental divergence between the sections, and the
effect four years of war had had on attitudes and interests within them, be fully comprehended."
MICHAEL PERLMAN, REUNION WITHOUT COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH AND RECONSTRUCTION 347
(1973). "The Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood as a whole, for while respecting
federalism, it intervened directly in Southern politics, seeking to conjure into being a new political
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U.S. Supreme Court decisions have elaborately drawn out implica-
tions of this suspicion. In all cases, it appears, the Equal Protection
Clause figures as pertinent because the proposition that individuals are
to be treated as equals, in the particular context, is independently
attested as a matter of either federal or state law. It is for precisely this
reason, after all, that the question arises regarding official "loyalty" -
official adherence to the equal protection obligation. 94 Otherwise, dif-
ferences in treatment would be readily defensible as responses to differ-
ences in circumstances, however large or small. For example, state
legislative refusals to employ the rule of "one person, one vote" in draw-
ing election districts, exhibiting at best indifference to whether the votes
of individuals will vary in significance from district to district, disregard
the Fourteenth Amendment declaration of state citizens as equals (indi-
viduals voting in state elections act in their capacity as state citizens)
and, therefore, also disregard the Equal Protection Clause.95 Restrictive
state definitions of residency, denying newcomers access to government
services or benefits, may or may not disparage equal state citizenship
(residence is, after all, a prerequisite for state citizenship96). The burden
of such restrictions, however, falls on individuals who exercise the
opportunity to move from state to state (presupposed in the federal con-
stitutional arrangement97), an opportunity therefore counting as a privi-
lege of national citizenship98 and, thus, as an "equal privilege" for
leadership that would respect the principle of equality before the law." ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 259 (1988). Section 1 obligations were
imposed - and ought to be read - as a response to the assumptions about the persistence of civil
division and uncertain official adherence that the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole reflects.
94. For a time, these cases were thought of as "fundamental interests" cases. Equal
protection concerns, the argument ran, derived from the importance as such of the interests
differentially treated. The idea of "importance" turned out - not surprisingly - to be a too
capacious portmanteau. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 43-72 (1980). Since San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court has - for the most part - restricted its references to
fundamental interests to interests somehow independently legally marked as carrying equality
concomitants.
95. "With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a
State, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565 (1964).
96. Absent proper justification, a state would violate the equal citizenship requirement if it
acknowledged residence but nonetheless treated newcomers differently. See Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophesy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portend the Future - Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110,
127-31 (1999). Professor Tribe argues that equal citizenship is "a structural principle." Id. at 154.
Remarkably, it is just as much a proposition evident from Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment's plain text.
97. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 48-49 (1867); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 1, 84 (1824).
98. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872).
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Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Exclusion of new arrivals denies the
equal protection of state law, absent peculiar characteristics of particular
services or benefits explaining the restriction.99
Other propositions part of U.S. constitutional law also carry equal-
ity concomitants and therefore set the stage for equal protection inquiries
- for example, free speech guarantees, the due process rights of privacy,
and (more obliquely) the Supremacy Clause. t°° For present purposes,
however, state law predicates are especially noteworthy.10' If states vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause because, for example, they deny indi-
gent criminal defendants access to free trial transcripts1°2 or appointed
counsel for purposes of appeal,0 3 it is because the significance of appeal
(or counsel), judged within the parameters of the criminal procedure that
state law itself depicts as uniform, is so sufficiently central that the
regime's professed objectives - error correction, for example - become
irrelevant (or nearly so) for disadvantaged defendants."° If state civil
procedure authorizes a particular state court to entertain actions of a cer-
tain sort, the court cannot refuse to hear federal claims of the "same
99. Compare Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one year denial of
access to free non-emergency medical care struck down), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)
(one year bar to bringing divorce action upheld).
100. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 446-60 (1972); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 (1982).
101. State equal treatment commitments trigger equal protection concerns not because state
officials themselves take those predicates seriously as a matter of their own understanding of state
law, but because federal constitutional law - here, concerns giving shape to Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection obligations - provides a reason within federal law to take state
commitments at face value, to characterize state law as incorporating federally constitutionally
relevant commitments occasioning equal protection scrutiny. For the point of departure for this
formulation, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1919, 1935-47 (2003).
102. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956).
103. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963).
104. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 619-22 (2005). Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the Halbert majority, described the constitutional concerns as originating in both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 610-11. Her
opinion, however, emphasized the distinctive (unequal) difficulties a pro se defendant would face
seeking appellate review after a plea bargain that a defendant represented by counsel would not
face. See id. at 619-20. Not surprisingly from the equal protection perspective, the constitutional
challenge fails if, given the terms of state law, "indigents have an adequate opportunity to present
their claims fairly within the adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to provide indigent defendants
appointed counsel regarding second-tier discretionary review following counsel-assisted first-tier
review).
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type."' 5 But if "a neutral state rule" bars the federal claim, 11 6 or if the
state court proceeded case-by-case in agreeing to hear or decline certain
sorts of suits, failure to hear the federal case would not be problematic -
the state would not have acted "in a systematic fashion to discriminate
against federal causes of action."' 1 7 Some state law complexes, in con-
trast, suggest no Fourteenth Amendment benchmark - no provocation
for equal protection scrutiny. The Texas public school finance scheme
tying expenditure choices to local property tax resources upheld in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez'°8 plainly "provide[d]
less freedom of choice ...for some districts than for others."' 0 9 But
that result was not a divergence from state policy, rather an artifact of
the state commitment to local control, and and thus a constitutionally
inconsequential inequality: "[A]ny scheme of local taxation - indeed the
105. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). Justice Black invoked what he took to be the
Supremacy Clause's "purpose and effect": "the States of the Union constitute a nation." Id. at
389. But the "same type" inquiry is plainly a test tied to a nondiscrimination worry - the
Supremacy Clause, keyed to conflict between state and federal law, presumably would be
pertinent in any instance in which federal statutory aims were frustrated. See Note, Utilization of
State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial
Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 970 (1947). Justice Black's reading of the Supremacy Clause,
moreover, might be thought to be anachronistic given antebellum understandings of the status of
the states vis-A-vis the United States. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 608-26 (1842)
(plurality opinion); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 39 (describing the early understanding that Congress could not
compel state courts to hear federal question cases). For a recent, notably thoughtful reappraisal,
see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 Gao. L.J. 949
(2006). Testa, however, also relied heavily on Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876). This is
the central passage in Justice Bradley's opinion there:
The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much
binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States is
not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and,
within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty. . . . Legal or equitable rights,
acquired under either system of law, may be enforced in any court of either
sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind of rights and not restrained
by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction.... The fact that a State court
claims its existence and functions from the State laws is no reason why it should not
afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as
much bound to recognize these as operative within the States as it is to recognize the
State laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes
the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not
foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the
same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.
Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136-37. Justice Bradley's phrases blast like Civil War cannon. The Fourteenth
Amendment overtones are hard to miss. Indeed, it is easy to read the entire passage as simply a
gloss on the phrase "the equal protection of the laws." See also Note, supra, at 970-71
(distinguishing nondiscrimination rule from Supremacy Clause analysis per se).
106. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
107. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).
108. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
109. Id. at 50.
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very existence of identifiable local governmental units - requires the
establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably
arbitrary."' 1o
The conclusions to be drawn: It is not at all surprising within this
larger context to read Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Allegheny
Pittsburgh - the point of departure for this excursus - treating the state
constitutional demand that property tax assessment be uniform as reason
for judging a county assessor's two-track approach to be a matter of
federal constitutional concern. The sometime discretion generated by
the Florida statutory scheme empowering and regulating proxies making
end-of-life decisions on behalf of unconscious individuals - the possibil-
ity, both intermittent and systematic, that in cases like Schiavo the repre-
sentative's preferences will govern as much or more than the
unconscious individual's own views - defines what should now appear
to be a cognate equal protection problem. Article I, section 23, of the
Florida Constitution, recognizing the right of privacy that the Florida
Supreme Court understood in Browning as the foundation of the individ-
ual's right to refuse life support, explicitly declares an "equal right," a
power to choose afforded "[e]very natural person.""' Browning itself
emphasized the particular equality commitment pertinent in Terri Schi-
avo's case: "[O]ur cases have recognized no basis for drawing a consti-
tutional line between the protections afforded to competent persons and
incompetent persons. Indeed, the right of privacy would be an empty
right were it not to extend to competent and incompetent persons
alike." 12 Florida's complex guardianship structure, it should be appar-
ent, in some circumstances plainly qualifies this declaration.
The question of congressional power: Congress could have plausi-
bly concluded, therefore, that in the setting of the Schiavo controversy
Florida statutory arrangements warranted an equal protection inquiry.
Its grounds for acting would have been entirely in accord with the U.S.
Supreme Court's own understandings. Congress possessed a defensible
basis for enacting the Schiavo jurisdictional grant pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. A SECOND DISTRICT COUP?
Public Law 109-3, the law that Congress enacted on March 21,
2005, directly addresses - remarkably clearly, really - the constitutional
110. Id. at 53-54.
111. Art. I, § 23, FLA. CONST.; see In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla.
1990).
112. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12.
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problem posed by statutorily-afforded proxy discretion seemingly
shielded from state judicial review:
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on a
suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged
violation of any right ... under the Constitution or laws of the United
States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or
medical treatment necessary to sustain life .... In such a suit, the
District Court shall determine de novo any claim of a violation of any
right of Theresa Marie Schiavo within the scope of this Act, notwith-
standing any prior State court determination . . . . [T]he District
Court shall issue such declaratory and injunctive relief as may be
necessary to protect the fights of Theresa Marie Schiavo .... Noth-
ing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive fights not oth-
erwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of
the several States.'13
If the substantial evidence standard blocked state court review, federal
de novo scrutiny of Michael Schiavo's choices as guardian, in the exer-
cise of the powers Florida Statutes chapters 744 and 765 granted to him,
afforded the opportunity for a fully searching judicial look, an entirely
apt occasion for determining whether the truly decisive element had
been Terri Schiavo's wishes and not the vagaries of path dependency or
Michael Schiavo's own judgments. If Terri Schiavo's wishes had not
governed - contra Browning and therefore contra the Equal Protection
Clause - the federal district court could exercise its statutory power to
halt withdrawal of sustenance.
The dog did not bark, however. In the end, the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, sustained by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, undertook no direct and independent
review of Michael Schiavo's guardianship - and indeed counsel did not
press for such review per se. 114 At the threshold, considering the
requested preliminary injunction that would have continued life support
pending further inquiry, the federal courts concluded that there was no
"substantial case on the merits" to be made, and thus usual equitable
principles - left unmodified by Congress - did not warrant granting pro-
visional relief.' 15 The federal courts ruled against the backdrop of argu-
ments of counsel that did not challenge the discretion that Michael
Schiavo exercised as guardian. Instead, counsel emphasized the role of
113. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1-3,
5, 119 Stat. 15, 15-16 (2005) (internal divisions omitted).
114. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh




Judge Greer - the Florida circuit court judge reviewing the guardian's
determination - who (it was asserted) "'became Terri's health care sur-
rogate"' and thus could not, counsel claimed, "'maintain his role as an
impartial judge in order to review his own decision that Terri would
want to die.""' 6 Judge Whittemore - the federal district judge -
rejected this argument:
Pursuant to Florida law... Judge Greer... had a statutory obligation
to resolve the competing contentions between Michael Schiavo and
[the Schindlers] .... By fulfilling his statutory judicial responsibili-
ties, the judge was not transformed into an advocate merely because
his rulings are unfavorable to a litigant. . . . [Michael Schiavo] is
correct that no federal constitutional right is implicated when a judge
merely grants relief to a litigant in accordance with the law he is
sworn to uphold and follow.
1 17
Judge Whittemore's discussion, though, appears to be utterly ques-
tion-begging. If Judge Greer's "statutory judicial responsibilities" were
delimited by the substantial evidence standard, Greer would have
stepped outside his state judicial role if he took over the task of surro-
gate and determined for himself what Terri Schiavo would have wanted.
There is nothing in the federal district court opinion, however, that sug-
gests that either Judge Whittemore or counsel considered the matter
within these terms. Why not? The key may lie in a curious contention
summarized and rejected in the Eleventh Circuit opinion: "Nor do we
find convincing plaintiffs' argument that in reaching its decision to deny
the motion for a temporary restraining order the district court violated
Pub. L. No. 109-3 by considering the procedural history of extensive
state court litigation.""' 8 What was it that counsel did not want Judge
Whittemore to read?
The principal appellate review of Judge Greer's work, written by
Chief Judge Alternbemd on behalf of a three-judge panel of the Florida
Second District Court of Appeal, included this remarkable passage:
[I]n the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents
have for their children. It is about Theresa Schiavo's right to make
her own decision, independent of her parents and independent of her
husband. In circumstances such as these, when families cannot
agree, the law has opened the doors of the circuit courts to permit
trial judges to serve as surrogates or proxies to make decisions about
life-prolonging procedures .... It is the trial judge's duty not to make
the decision that the judge would make for himself or herself or for a
loved one. Instead, the trial judge must make a decision that the clear
116. Id. at 1233 (district court opinion).
117. Id. at 1233-34. For the Eleventh Circuit's terse affirmation, see id. at 1226.
118. Id. at 1228.
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and convincing evidence shows the ward would have made for her-
self ... It is a thankless task, and one to be undertaken with care,
objectivity, and a cautious legal standard designed to promote the
value of life. But it is also a necessary function if all people are to be
entitled to a personalized decision about life-prolonging procedures
independent of the subjective and conflicting assessments of their
friends and relatives. It may be unfortunate that.., the best forum
we can offer for this private, personal decision is a public courtroom
and the best decision-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior
knowledge of the ward, but the law currently provides no better
solution ...."9
At an earlier point in the opinion, Altembernd makes it clear that - at
least in Schiavo - the Second District panel itself took up the trial
judge's "thankless task":
In this case, the guardianship court followed the instructions of our
last decision. It conducted a thorough hearing and prepared an exten-
sive order. We cannot conclude that the guardianship court abused
its discretion .... The Schindlers have urged this court to conduct a
de novo review. . . . The guardianship court heard live testimony
from many physicians. When it reviewed the videotapes of Mrs.
Schiavo and the diagnostic tests and brain scans, it did so with the
assistance and expertise of those physicians. This court can review
the evidence in the record with only its training in law and its lay
experience. It is simply not proper for this court to review such a
fact-intensive determination using a de novo standard. Despite our
decision that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discre-
tion, this court has closely examined all the evidence in this record.
We have repeatedly examined the videotapes, not merely watching
short segments but carefully observing the tapes in their entirety. We
have examined the brain scans with the eyes of educated laypersons
and considered the explanations provided by the doctors in the tran-
scripts. We have concluded that, if we were called upon to review
the guardianship court's decision de novo, we would still affirm it. 2 o
There is nothing in the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Browning
remotely equivalent to these passages. Justice Barkett noted that "the
surrogate would bear the burden of proof if a decision based on purely
119. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186-87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(citations omitted). For an appreciative, but also critical, discussion of this passage, see Robert A.
Burt, Family Conflict and Family Privacy: The Constitutional Violation in Terri Schiavo's Death,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 432-33 (2005). At an earlier stage in the case, Judge Alternbernd
wrote: "The trial court determines whether the evidence is sufficient to allow it to make the
decision for the ward to discontinue life support. In this context, the trial court essentially serves
as the ward's guardian." In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
120. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d at 186.
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oral evidence was challenged."'' 2 But her opinion also concluded, con-
sidering the facts of the Browning case itself, that "[w]e are satisfied that
clear and convincing evidence existed to support a finding that Mrs.
Browning suffered from a terminal condition. Under these circum-
stances, the surrogate was correct."' 122 The exercise, plainly, was one of
judicial review of a surrogate's decision - not judicial exercise of the
surrogacy role itself. Section 765.401(3), Florida Statutes, declares that
''a proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence" - an instruction
plainly directed first to a guardian or other representative and thus a
basis for judicial review, not judicial substitution (judges are not
included in the list of section 765.401(1) proxy candidates).
A Second District coup? Hardly. It is enough to recall the com-
mon law foundations of the Florida constitutional right of privacy. It is
enough as well to recall the notable legislative modesty chapter 765
avows.' 2 3 Judicial assertion of primary jurisdiction, as against legisla-
tive efforts especially, is not so extraordinary a phenomenon within the
working assumptions of Florida constitutional law (if not necessarily
noncontroversial) as it might appear to be within the terms of other con-
stitutional points of view.
124
Judge Greer, at the trial level, and the Second District Court of
Appeal, at the intermediate appellate level, mooted the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection concern. Adjudication of a motion for a
preliminary injunction provided an altogether sufficient context within
which federal district Judge Whittemore could educate himself in this
regard. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that in the end counsel
presented Judge Whittemore with seemingly marginal, grab-bag claims
and that Judge Whittemore and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
claims so brusquely.125 The central problem which would have - it
seems - constitutionally justified congressional action had been
addressed already by state judicial improvisation. Congress did not act
unconstitutionally. The federal judges did not act impertinently.
It was all - only - excruciatingly - unnecessary.
121. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
122. Id. at 17.
123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
124. For the classic study, see Alan C. Swan, Administrative Adjudication of Constitutional
Questions: Confusion in Florida Law and a Dying Misconception in Federal Law, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 527 (1979).
125. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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